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Introduction  
On August 15, 2015, Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr was arrested at the Beirut International Airport while 
trying to flee to Nigeria with a fake passport. Even though all groups of the political class applauded 
the capture of the man wanted for his role in the bloody events that took place in Abra, near Saida, in 
June 2013, where 18 soldiers of the Lebanese Armed Forces lost their lives in a confrontation with 
al-‘Asîr’s partisans, the re-appearance of this icon of radical Sunni mobilisation underscored a deep 
sectarian divide among the Lebanese population. A family member of one of the soldiers killed 
expressed his concern about a double standard in the application of laws and security between Sunnis 
and Shiites. He was referring to the unsuccessful capture of a Hizbullah member accused of the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri (Nader 2015). This particular event raises the 
issue of a major change of perception among the Sunni community in Lebanon; it also highlights a 
broader mindset according to which Iran and Hizbullah are responsible for the emergence of radical 
Sunni groups in the country and for the exclusion of a moderate political faction like the Hariri-led 
Future Movement (al-mustaqbal).  
This change of perception becomes quite clear when one remembers that Sunnis represented the 
Muslims of Lebanon in the National Pact (1943), which gave the community a key role in the process 
of nationhood building. They were at the core of the state apparatus by virtue of them being granted 
the position of prime minister and several other key functions, including head of the Internal Security 
Forces (ISF). While their position as a community dwindled during the civil war (Kassir 1994), a 
major figure emerged during the post-civil war era: Rafic Hariri. As prime minister and a rich 
businessman with connections to Saudi Arabia, he became a point of reference among the community 
while promoting a policy based on the exaltation of Sunni belonging and founding al-mustaqbal 
party. This strategy very soon pushed Hariri to become the undisputed leader of the Sunni communityi 
and paved the way to the “Harirification” of Lebanese Sunnism. After the unification of the Sunnis 
in the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination in 2005, Sunnism inexorably started faced an erosion 
regarding its weight in Lebanese politics: The new status of the Sunni community in Lebanon became 
one of political, social, and economic marginalisation.  
In order to examine the recent transformation of Lebanese communities, with a focus especially on 
the post-2011 period, we will use the trajectory of Sunnism as a case study. Our hypothesis is that 
Harirism, a moderate socio-political phenomenon born with the political rise of Rafic Hariri in the 
1990s, changed after his assassination, influencing the self-perception as well as the perception of 
‘the other’ disseminated among Sunnis in Lebanon. The period between the “Cedar Revolution” (Salti 
2005; Safa 2006) and the Arab revolts of 2011 has been crucial for the transformation of the Sunni 
community. The 2011 revolts in particular, even though they had no direct effects on the resilience 
of the Lebanese consociative system (Fakhoury 2011), contributed to modifying the positions of some 
Lebanese political actors from various communities. These actors, taking open stances towards the 
Syrian crisis, have deepened the polarisation inside the political and communitarian spectrum (Di 
Peri 2014). They have also led the way towards the modification of the boundaries of some of the 
leading (particularly Sunni and Maronite) Lebanese communities that, assaulted by internal and 
external factors, are gradually questioning the very concept of “community”.  
After reflecting on the shifting boundaries of the term “community”, we delve into the 
problematisation of such a category by analysing two opposite dynamics: on the one hand, the 
transformation of “Harirism” after Hariri’s assassination; on the other hand, the recent radical upsurge 
in the Sunni community. We examine the latter by studying the mobilisation activities around Sheikh 
al-‘Asîr that took place in the city of Sidon (Hariri’s family stronghold) after 2011. 
The changing role of the concept of community in Lebanon  
Community is not a “natural” fact in Lebanese society; it is a social structure that embodies history, 
politics, and social actors’ changing interpretations of issues, including external and internal factors 
that have shaped its definition. In this sense, there is no unique definition of what a community is, 
although a useful distinction will avoid any confusion. Following Beydoun (1984), a community can 
be understood as a sectarian belief group, which makes it possible for us to talk about sects or religious 
communities. “Community” also encompasses a larger spectrum of social life, as it can be understood 
as a social group of belonging, a rather secular dimension of belonging that is equated with ethnic 
belonging. In historical terms, this process can be explained through the lens of its social function 
and its adaptation during times of changing political environments. In the Ottoman Empire, as a 
powerful force that binds, orders, and identifies people, community was defined as “millet”, which 
became “nation” during the 19th century and thus produced a collective consciousness of belonging. 
At the same time, they were also granted greater autonomy. Against the backdrop of the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Mutasarrifiyya system – under the protection of the European powers and 
following the “Règlement Organique” (1861), a form of communitarian division promoted by the 
Great Powers to pacify the Mount Lebanon area – brought the communities into politics and 
transformed civilian and religious institutions into political actors, which politicised collective 
identities by labelling them as “Maronites”, “Druzes” or “Sunnis”. During the time of the French 
Mandate in Lebanon (1920–43), the territory’s communities, rejuvenated and empowered within the 
new political design of a nation state, were shored up as political structures after independence (1943).  
It is interesting to note that the meaning of the term “community” has undergone an important shift 
in Lebanon, especially after the end of the civil war (1989). Before the war, the most common 
expressions to indicate the framework in which communities acted and lived were “communalism” 
or “communitarianism”.ii By contrast, the most used label after the war, particularly after the Hariri 
assassination in 2005, has been “sectarianism”. This semantic shift is not without consequence. If, 
before the civil war, community was considered to be at the heart of the so-called Lebanese 
consociative system (Lijparth 1969) that functioned, despite its limits and constraints, until the 
outbreak of the civil war (Dekmejian 1978; Fakhoury 2009), the term “sectarianism” gradually 
emerged after the war, also because of the relevance it gained in academic debate. The publication of 
Vali Nasr’s book The Shia revival in 2007 opened the way for the subsequent rise of the so-called 
sectarian rift (Norton 2015): the narrative of permanent clashes between the Sunnis and Shiites. This 
regional debate also had an important influence on Lebanon (Heydemann 2013; Salloukh 2013). 
However, interesting enough, Lebanon is not new to the debate around communitarianism, 
sectarianism, confessionalism, and so on (Makdisi 2000). The novelty of the sectarian narrative is 
that it has become pervasive, introducing itself not just in academic debates but also in the daily life 
relations of the Lebanese, especially after the 2011 uprisings (Kingston 2013; Salloukh 2015). If the 
term “community” used to have a neutral connotation, its evolution into sectarianism has clearly 
marked it in a negative way. This “sectarian hegemony” produces negative effects on at least two 
levels: on the one hand, it imposes itself as an all-encompassing meta-narrative able to explain all the 
regional phenomena; on the other hand, it reproduces the image of a fragmented region unable to 
cope with violent phenomena and pervaded by barbarianism (Di Peri 2016). According to this reading 
of the regional situation, which has important consequences for Lebanon, the domestic situation has 
been analysed by focusing especially on inter-sectarian tensions and on the effects of regional 
sectarian threats on Lebanon. However, in order to go beyond the logic of “sectarianism hegemony”, 
the communities, and the processes behind the production and reproduction of their identity, are the 
actors to examine, even if they have blurred borders and are internally fragmented or somehow 
marginalised. 
The ‘Harirification’ of Sunnism   
The assassination of Rafic Hariri was a shock for the country. From that moment on, the Sunni 
community, which since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 (Zamir 1985) has played a vital role 
in the “country of the Cedars”, along with the Maronites, started to perceive itself as both socially 
and politically marginalised. However, this feeling is not new to the Sunni community: even before 
the outbreak of the civil war (Picard 2011), it had experienced a period of crisis at the political level 
with the loss of power of the traditional zu'ama and had no prominent figure or political party to 
reverse the situation (Johnson 1986).  
After the civil war, a new founding pact, the Taif Agreement, further legitimised the pivotal role of 
the Sunni community by putting it on an equal footing with the Maronite community at the expense 
of the Shiites. However, the defeat of the Sunni militias, the general radicalisation of the Sunni left, 
and the upsurge in radical Islamism during the 1980s left the Sunni zu'ama in a much weaker position 
than at the outbreak of the war. By contrast, the heightened communal identity and the retreat of the 
state gave Sunni religious institutions a central role in Sunni communal and political life, and the 
Maqâsid Society (a charity organisation) became a focal point for the community (Skovgaard-
Petersen 1998). 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the pre-eminence of the Sunni community over the Maronites had a 
controversial and charismatic figure as a witness to the reshaping of its own narrative: Rafic Hariri. 
A native of Sidon, a Sunni stronghold in southern Lebanon, Hariri was a leading actor in Lebanese 
politics during the 1990s and helped to strengthen the idea of a “lay” Sunnism with a solidly 
entrepreneurial mindset. The construction of the narrative of the “new man” gave new visibility to 
the Sunni community, which found in Hariri a powerful, unifying leader. Hariri created a new socio-
political phenomenon: “Harirism”. The term succinctly illustrates how Hariri gradually imposed 
himself on the Lebanese political scene through control of the Sunni community, so much so that, 
over the years, the identification between ‘Harirism’ and Sunnism became increasingly stronger. 
Broadly speaking, a “Harirification” of Sunnism was taking place. However, it should be emphasised 
that Hariri’s political strategy was (at least, initially) trans-confessional. The rhetoric of “newism” 
that Hariri proposed was rooted in his detachment from the traditional politics marked by the zu'ama 
and their systems of patronage (Naba 1999). Furthermore, in contrast with traditional Lebanese 
politics, Hariri decided not to insert himself directly into the political scene but tried to seek trans-
confessional legitimacy through philanthropic works (Baumann 2012) and mammoth reconstruction 
projects. This posture allowed him to accumulate vast political capital to spend at the appropriate 
time (Bonne 1995).iii 
Very soon, however, Hariri realised that playing by these rules would not help him maintain control 
over his political career. After his election as prime minister in 1992 and again in 1996, Hariri’s 
popularity grew thanks to strong investments in various public sectors, especially in the stronghold 
of Sidon but also in downtown Beirut. But the picture rapidly changed. The reconstruction projects 
included in the “Horizon 2000” programme were strongly criticised for not delivering on earlier 
promises: Primarily concentrated in Beirut at the expenses of other regions (Volk 2009), the projects 
were mainly focused on expanding the financial sector instead of the agriculture and industry sectors, 
and they favoured economic and urban infrastructures at the expense of human capital (Denoeux & 
Springborg 1998). Moreover, these plans were only partially implemented, and all in all they had a 
weak impact on the country’s real economy: Some of the profits went to the international companies 
involved in the reconstruction process; others were intended to finance the importation of materials; 
and still others went to cover the wages paid to non-Lebanese workers involved in these projects (Di 
Peri 2009). At the same time, the overall economic situation was deteriorating. Hariri’s economic 
policies led to the country becoming heavily indebted: Public debt rose from 20% to 42% between 
1992 and 2000 (Nasr 2003). Lastly, in those years, the political climate and the manoeuvers of the 
so-called troika were characterised by strong confessional tensions that strengthened the consociative 
model instead of abolish it, as foreseen by the Taif Agreement (Kassir 2000). 
All these factors pushed Hariri to develop a different strategy than the one that had previously been 
adopted, namely to adapt to the “Lebanese system” by embracing the communitarian option. This 
process materialised in controlling the key institutions of Sunnism, such as the charity organisations 
(the Maqâsid Society being the first), and, through them, the religious leaders who guaranteed control 
of the election of the mufti, the most prestigious position in Lebanese Sunnism (Skovgaard-Petersen 
1998). These manoeuvers included the ousting and weakening of all the Sunni leaders’ rivals and 
gradually pushed Hariri to build a family dynasty (Vloeberghs 2012). As part of this strategy, Hariri 
exploited to their advantage (often in contradictory way) the “calls” to identity and tradition: On the 
one hand, he used the rejection of the past, especially doing tabula rasa of Lebanese cultural heritage, 
to promote his mammoth projects with Solidere for the country’s reconstruction (Daily Star 2000); 
on the other hand, he exploited his ties with the past Sunni tradition, underlining his belonging to this 
tradition. His philanthropic activities, especially through the Hariri Foundation, soon became an 
instrument to generate profit but primarily to accumulate political capital for the elections (Becherer 
2005). Philanthropy became way to secure old constituencies and constructing ever-larger political 
bases. This process of the “Harirification” of Sunnism culminated in Hariri becoming the de facto 
leader of the Sunnis with the building of the largest mosque in the centre of Beirut, a symbol of the 
return to tradition (Vloeberghs 2008). 
Hariri’s assassination marked a freeze in the process of “Harirification”, which had at least two 
effects: the incapacity of his successor, his son Saad, to preserve the political legacy of his father and 
the shifting of the ideological boundaries of Sunnism. This latter aspect will be analysed in the 
following section by looking at the case of the rise of Sheikh al-‘Asîr. As for the former aspect, it 
should be noted that Saad Hariri, because he lacks his father’s charisma and political resources, was 
unable to ride the wave of protests that followed the assassination and gave rise to the birth of the 
March 14 coalition and his al-mustaqbal Party (Choucair 2006; Haugbolle 2006). Only the official 
establishment of the party, which already took place in 2007 but only materialised in 2009, prompted 
Saad Hariri to use the party, more than the financial empire of the father or his philanthropic activities, 
to rally the Sunni community behind him. This party logic, however, was far removed from Sunnism. 
As a result, Saad Hariri has failed in his attempt to complete a triple identification: the identification 
of the party with the leader, the identification of the leader with the community, and consequently, 
the identification of the community with the party.iv There were two reasons for this failure: first, the 
difficulties that Saad had in holding together a community using a party and coalition logic that were 
in many ways alien to the Lebanese context,v and second, closely related to the first reason, Saad’s 
lack of leadership within this coalition, which was very fragmented and in search of its own identity.vi 
Looking at the evolution of the March 14 coalition led by al-mustaqbal, it is evident that the members 
of the Party have gradually lost contact with their basis and struggle to act as a credible partner within 
the Lebanese political system.vii At the same time, the coalition showed a willingness to undermine 
the institutions of the state as soon as they were no longer controllable or acting in its interest. 
One of the battles on which Saad Hariri and his party have lost credibility is its position against 
Hizbullah and its disarmament since Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005 and especially after the war 
with Israel in 2006. “Harirism” was based on the division of labour between Rafic Hariri and 
Hizbullah and concerned with mapping the future of Lebanon, while Hizbullah acted as a guardian 
of its past and created a mythology aimed at preserving the country’s historical identity and Arab 
dimension (Karl ReMarks 2000). After Hariri’s death, the two political coalitions’ struggle over the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon – created to investigate his assassination – culminated in a corruption 
scandal when it was revealed that Saad Hariri had manipulated witnesses to finger Hizbullah as being 
responsible for his father’s death. This was one example of the end of pragmatism for Sunnism. 
Another example is the rise of the controversy between Saad and the Lebanese Army, a legacy of his 
father Rafic (Aziz 2011), which became evident on the “Day of Wrath” (January 25, 2011), when 
armed militants of the March 14 coalition were shooting in the streets of Beirut, targeting the 
Lebanese Army.viii One of the more evident consequences of this new form of Harirism is the loss of 
the aura of moderation and political pragmatism that had always characterised Rafic Hariri’s political 
activity and, in many ways, put distance between Harirism and violent attitudes.ix This change in 
attitude engendered at least three consequences: First, Sunnism abandoned its moderate posture, 
which left space for the emergence of radical Sunni fringes that had been latent in Lebanon since 
2011; second, the boundaries of the Sunni community, painstakingly held together through the 
process of “Harirification”, were frayed, which highlighted the difficulty of identifying a strong and 
unified leadership capable of affecting Lebanon at both institutional and confessional levels (Samaha 
2013); and finally, the posture of Saad Hariri was a critical factor in Hizbullah’s decision to support 
the Assad regime in Syria and produced a new wave of sectarian claims that have increased the 
distance between the country’s communities (Aslam 2012).x Despite Saad Hariri’s brief return to 
Lebanon in August 2014, following three years of self-imposed exile after his government was 
toppled by a coalition including Hizbullah, Harirism seems to continue to be deep in crisis. As Ahmad 
Fatfat, a deputy of al-mustaqbal, declared, “the threat against Saad Hariri will remain as long as there 
are illegitimate weapons in Lebanon” – a declaration that clearly illustrates the perceived persistence 
of the threat of the Islamic Party for the Sunni leader and Hariri inability to produce a new political 
strategy (Daily Star 2014). 
The game changer in town: Ahmad al-‘Asîr as a new face of political Sunnism  
The transformation of the Sunni community is also palpable when it comes to the emergence of a 
new profile and means of mobilisation. Among the sect’s radical fringes, it is recognised that “most 
Salafists of all stripes have in some ways mobilised their community against Hizbullah and the Syrian 
regime” (Rabil 2014). Within this process of change and radicalisation among the Sunnis, mainly in 
the area of Tripoli (Rougier 2011; Gade 2015), the figure of Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr emerged late in 
2011 as an interesting Salafist preacher who managed to gather a local radical group of partisans 
around a small mosque in Abra, a suburb of Saida. The main rationale for this mobilisation was in 
line with two main stances of the Future Movement: the support of the Syrian insurgents (Caillet 
2012) and the denunciation of Hizbullah as a factor in the destabilisation of Lebanon. It is therefore 
necessary to focus on the mobilisation strategy that Sheikh al-‘Asîr followed in order to understand 
the kind of shift within the Sunni community at the double level of means of action and self-
perception. We will see that, surprisingly, al-‘Asîr adopted a behaviour, a repertoire of action, and a 
general imaginary that refers to a minority sect. 
The social context in Saida in 2011, when al-‘Asîr started his mobilisation, is marked by the 
polarisation of the Lebanese political forces with respect to the Syrian crisis, as al-mustaqbal was 
facing Mustapha Sa’ad (a local ally of March 8) and Hizbullah militants in the city and its 
surroundings. The socioeconomic situation in Saida was already critical. Beneath the touristic 
reshaping of roads and streets in the old city, a process of pauperisation was affecting the majority of 
local inhabitants, mostly Sunni, because of a lack of investments, and it was slowly disenfranchising 
the local population at its fringes.xi Sectarian affiliation soon became the only common identity for 
inhabitants who perceived themselves as abandoned by the central power and instrumentalised by the 
main political parties. This is where Al-‘Asîr found fertile ground for his mobilisation based on 
resentment and a feeling of marginalisation. He was also able to capitalise on a frustration with the 
Shiites because of the political fight of early “May 2008 events” that saw a confrontation between 
Hizbullah and the March 14 government led by Fouad Siniora. During these heady days, Hizbullah’s 
militiamen and allies sealed off West Beirut and stranded Walid Jumblat and Saad Haririxii in their 
houses, thus shedding a crude light on the Future Movement’s impotence against the Shi’i movement. 
In the following years, several attacks targeted senior security officers and political leaders, all of 
them coming from the Sunni community. Al-‘Asîr was able to play on sectarian honour and transform 
a political weakness into a sectarian threat. This link between sects, politics, and honour was repeated 
in his Friday sermons along the following lines: 
We won’t accept this abject (haqīra) Syrian-Iranian tutelage (over Lebanon)! [...] Enough 
contempt for the Sunnis! Enough contempt for their blood, their security and the honour of 
their wives!xiii 
 
Manufacturing a sectarian reading of the situation, al-‘Asîr was able to mobilise anger and 
dissatisfaction to blame the pro-Syrian regime partisans identified with the Shi’i community. One 
way in which this strategy of sectarianising dissent from the Shia was built is quite apparent in the 
religious dispute that occurred with Mohammad Yazbek, a top-ranking leader of Hizbullah.xiv Sheikh 
al-‘Asîr sparked a religious dispute after claiming Yazbek had “insulted” Aisha, the mother of the 
Prophet, and thus he positioned himself as the defender of the Sunni community. This sensitive matter 
in a multi-sectarian society allowed him full media attention and the ability to reach a larger Sunni 
constituency, close to al-mustaqbal. By mentioning the Hizbullah weaponry issue, a classical topic 
of the March 14 coalition, he implicitly bridged sectarian and political dissent. The strength of al-
‘Asîr’s posture lay in the powerful position of his Shi’i foe in the political game and in the brutality 
of the repression that the Syrian population, mainly Sunnis, suffered because of the Assad regime. 
The latter, defined as primarily Alawite, has been affiliated with the Shia since the onset of the Syrian 
uprising in Salafi circles, which pointed to an “evil alliance” between the two minorities in Islam: the 
Alawites and the Shia. This “natural” explanation of their political alliance helped Sheikh al-‘Asîr 
identify Hizbullah as an internal threat for the Sunnis of Lebanon and thus positioned his community 
as a victim and possibly as a gatekeeper of Islamic orthodoxy against deviant groups.xv The notion of 
the Sunnis as victims of Shi’i power was also fuelled by Miqati’s government, clearly oriented 
towards the March 8 coalition and pro-Hizbullah forces, which promoted its “dissociation policy” 
towards the Syrian uprising as a means of staying neutral in this turmoil. This so-called “neutrality” 
the Syrian regime’s brutal policy.xvi By opposing such a policy, al-‘Asîr kept calling for the fall of 
the Assad regime in Damascus and the disarmament of the Shia-led Hizbullah (Abi-Akl 2012). 
The seriousness of this political context and the general environment of the Syrian uprising and 
Hizbullah’s political domination in the era after the signing of the Doha Agreement seem to be quite 
significant, as al-‘Asîr’s biography did not suggest his life would take such a radical trajectory. One 
should note that he was not a recognised cleric and was preaching in a small mosque located in a 
suburb of Saida. Moreover, his previous affiliation with Jamaa al-Tabligh, a quietist religious 
movement that avoided any statements that could lead to conflict, was not really conducive to the 
gathering of radical partisans (Caillet 2012). In the meantime, among the opportunities that served 
al-‘Asîr well was the duration of his involvement in that mosque and his strategic opportunism in 
side-lining Saad Hariri’s Future Movement the moment the uprising started in Syria. His activism 
and his reputation as a Salafi figure grew during Ramadan in the summer of 2011 and secured him 
an audience. The economic situation in Saida also helped him to capitalise on discontent, as seen 
above. But most of all, Hizbullah was a very useful rival group, as it mobilised on the basis of 
religious affiliation, which al-‘Asîr violently denounced. In sum, this Shi’i image of Hizbullah, built 
up as a foe and progressively as the group responsible for the Sunnis’ disempowerment and 
vulnerability, largely contributed to the forming of al-‘Asîr’s identity as a radical leader struggling to 
defend the Sunnis’ pride and honour in Lebanon. Thus he stood in stark contrast to Saad Hariri, who 
lacked the ability to unify the Sunnis. 
Built on his social capital as a cleric, Sheikh al-‘Asîr’s Salafi movement was closely linked to him as 
a person. In this sense, his movement was familiar with the classical Lebanese political pattern, 
characterised by the personalisation of power as a main trend in politics (Messarra 1996). Between 
2000 and 2003, Sheikh al-‘Asîr became known as a Salafist, as it seemed clear that he followed the 
doctrinal principles of Salafism (Caillet 2012). In the meantime, like other sheikhs, he wanted to 
promote an image of himself as a non-sectarian figure by showing his moderation in the media in 
order to reach a wider spectrum of the Sunni citizens he was primarily targeting. Nevertheless, the 
populist and radical dimensions of al-‘Asîr’s movement can be highlighted by examining the steps 
and repertoire of the kind of mobilisation he adopted (Meier 2015).  
During an initial period, al-‘Asîr organised demonstrations in support of the Syrian uprisings or 
against Hizbullah’s weapons, exacerbating the polarisation of the political spectrum with regard to 
the Syrian uprising. Mobilised via social media, the Sheikh al-‘Asîr movement grew in number and 
tended to radicalise its actions by organising a sit-in in Saida for one and a half months, blocking a 
main road and thus continuing its strategy of entrism, and raising the flag of the Sunni community 
threatened by Hizbullah’s weapons. He explained this new approach by making an analogy with the 
Arab uprising in Egypt: “Our movement is similar to the one on Tahrir Square in Cairo. But the 
difference is that here injustice is armed” (l’Orient le Jour 2012). He also gave a definition of his 
protest as one that is intended to gather people from everywhere in Lebanon, as “all regions of 
Lebanon are hurt”. Al-‘Asîr clearly mentioned who hurt these regions: He identified the Shi’i 
movement of Hizbullah and used its “Resistance” label to show the contradictory nature of Hizbullah 
since it became involved alongside the Syrian regime. “You can live without bread or electricity but 
not without dignity. The Resistance party stole our dignity. From now on, we cannot accept this 
anymore” (l’Orient le Jour 2012). 
The second step was taken when another protest of the al-‘Asîr movement turned into an armed 
confrontation on November 11, 2012, because al-‘Asîr militants had torn down Hizbullah posters. 
The riots across the city of Saida resulted in several people injured on both sides and two dead among 
the al-‘Asîr militiamen (Daou 2012). Days later, al-‘Asîr displayed bloody images showing the faces 
of two of his partisans who were killed and a Hizbullah flag tarnished with blood, including sentences 
that read: “Hassan Nasrallah killed Ali Samhoun in Saida”, and “Hassan Nasrallah killed Lebanon”. 
This event signalled a process of militarisation of the movement that was visible when the Sheikh 
unsuccessfully tried to mobilise the Palestinian refugees from Syria in the Ain el-Hilweh camp in 
December in order to form a proper militia. In early 2013, he publicly appeared in military fatigues 
with an AK-47 rifle in his hand during a strong protest against the presence of Hizbullah militiamen 
in the vicinity of his mosque in Abra (l’Orient le Jour 2013a). 
A third and last step was taken later during the spring of 2013. Against the backdrop of the Qusayr 
battle that saw the Syrian Army being backed by Hizbullah members against the insurgents of the 
Free Syrian Army, al-‘Asîr issued a fatwa for jihad in Syria. In April, the area close to his mosque in 
Abra became the stronghold of his movement with big screens to see him preaching and carpets in 
the street for Friday prayer. While Hizbullah’s General Secretary revealed the involvement of his 
militia in the Qusayr battle alongside the Assad regime, the Sheikh publicly displayed the forming of 
a new militia named “the Phalanges of the Free Resistance”, primarily dedicated to enrolling local 
volunteers to fight in Syria for the Sunni cause (Baaklini 2013). In June, several militiamen, clearly 
affiliated with al-‘Asîr’s group, took control of Saida for a few hours as a means to flex their muscle 
(Khalil 2013). A few days later, a violent clash erupted at an army checkpoint near Abra. It resulted 
in the killing of four soldiers and led to the intervention of troops that ended up dislodging and killing 
many of al-‘Asîr’s partisans in an extremely brutal fight lasting 48 hours.xvii 
The effect of this disastrous end to the al-‘Asîr movement helped the al-mustaqbal movement 
officially distance itself from such extreme actions, although dialogue between Hizbullah and the 
Future Movement remains a challenge, particularly after Saad Hariri returned to Lebanon one year 
later. The disappearance of the Sheikh did not resolve the issue of the Sunnis’ feeling of 
marginalisation. Some of the radical fringes of the al-‘Asîr partisans went to Syria and joined Salafist 
jihadi groups like al-Qaeda.xviii However, in the light of the lingering political crisis affecting 
Lebanon, the majority of the community continues to see no reason to expect a significant change for 
the Sunnis in the foreseeable future. 
Conclusion 
Sunnism is currently being challenged by both internal and external factors. At the internal (domestic) 
level, the Sunni leadership’s confrontation with Hizbullah and its loss of credibility are the two main 
components of the crisis. At the external level, the regional transformations and the Syrian crisis have 
contributed to a change in the country’s confessional equilibrium. If, after the end of the civil war, 
the Harirification of Sunnism rested upon the creation of a unified leadership firmly in the hands of 
Rafic Hariri, the situation quickly changed after his death. The example of the mobilisation of Sheikh 
al-‘Asîr revealed a far less moderate and pragmatic face of Sunnism and pointed to a deep change in 
collective self-perception. This change is something new for Sunnism and one of the unexpected 
consequences of the Hariri assassination. As one of the historic communities of Lebanon for many 
decades, the Sunni community has been at the heart of the Lebanese political game, as evidenced by 
its centrality in the National Pact and in the Taif Agreement. However, after 2005, the Sunni 
community seems to be living – both politically and socially – in limbo. This community appears to 
be unable to fill the political vacuum left by Rafic Hariri and to tolerate its slow marginalisation 
within the country, which is also caused by the political rise of Hizbullah and to some extent, the 
“death of Harirism”. 
Another factor in the mutation of Sunnism in Lebanon is linked to the transformation of the balance 
of power in Lebanon. The Doha Agreement signed in 2008 clearly recognised the continuation of 
Syrian influence over Lebanon, manned by Hizbullah and its allies in the March 8 coalition. The 
context of the decline of the heirs to Harirism and the loss of its key influence over the state’s destiny 
opened the door to the emergence of several forms of radicalism, as had brutally come to pass in the 
Nahr el-Bared camp during the summer of 2007. It became palpable in Tripoli during the 
confrontation between the rival suburbs of Baal Mohsen and Bab Tebbaneh after the outbreak of the 
civil war in Syria, and later in Saida with the goal of targeting “Shi’i power” under the lead of Salafi 
Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr. His movement appeared as a by-product of the local dynamics of social 
exclusion in the Sunni environment and regional dynamics marked by the polarising effect of the 
Syrian uprisings on the Lebanese political scene. The radicalisation of the al-‘Asîr movement and its 
violent repertoire of action gave voice to a deep frustration of some fringes of the Sunni community 
and highlighted a major transformation of Sunnis’ self-perception as victims and a threatened 
category within Lebanese society. In the meantime, the failure and the violent excesses of al-‘Asîr 
radical trajectory as well as the spectre of uncontrolled violence affecting Sunni cities like Tripoli 
with the 2013 double car bombings, have probably contributed to a moderation of the internal political 
confrontation between the two opposite 8/14 March blocs.   
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